Question 1 — Derived Demand for Labor (劳动的派生需求)

Why do firms demand labor even though consumers do not directly “want” labor?

为什么在消费者并不直接“需求”劳动的情况下,企业仍然会对劳动提出需求?

(若含公式示例: Firms hire workers only to produce outputs that can be sold; if product demand rises, MRPL rises and labor demand shifts right.
企业雇人是为了生产可销售的产出;当产品需求上升,劳动的边际收益产品上升,劳动需求右移。


Question 2 — MRPL vs. VMP (边际收益产品 vs 边际产品价值)

Under perfect competition, is the marginal revenue product of labor (MRPL) equal to the value of marginal product (VMP)? Explain.

在完全竞争下,劳动的边际收益产品(MRPL)是否等于边际产品价值(VMP)?请解释。

With P fixed for a competitive firm, extra revenue from one more unit of output equals P; hence each worker’s extra revenue is , identical to VMP.
竞争企业的产品价格固定,新增一单位产出带来的边际收益等于价格 ;因此一名工人的额外收益为 ,即 VMP。


Question 3 — Diminishing Returns (边际报酬递减)

State the law of diminishing returns in the context of labor holding other inputs fixed.

在其他要素不变的情况下,说明劳动的“边际报酬递减规律”。

Initially specialization can raise MPL, but congestion sets in; the declining MPL makes MRPL slope downward, forming the firm’s labor demand curve.
起初分工协作可提高 MPL,但随后拥挤与资源稀释使 MPL 下降,进而使 MRPL 向下倾斜,这就是企业的劳动需求曲线。


Question 4 — Movement vs. Shift (沿曲线移动 vs. 曲线位移)

What causes a movement along the labor demand curve and what causes the curve to shift?

是什么导致沿劳动需求曲线的“移动”,又是什么导致“曲线位移”?

Holding shifters constant, changing W moves you along MRPL. When P, MPL, technology, or market size changes, the entire MRPL schedule shifts.
在其他条件不变时,工资变动使企业在既定 MRPL 上移动;当价格、MPL、技术或行业规模变化时,MRPL 整体右移或左移。


Question 5 — Backward-Bending Labor Supply (反向弯曲的劳动供给)

Why might an individual supply fewer hours of labor at very high wages?

为何在极高工资下,个人可能反而减少供给的工作时长?

At high wages, a small reduction in hours still preserves high income; people “purchase” more leisure, bending the supply curve backward.
在高工资下,少工作一些仍有高收入,人们“购买”更多闲暇,供给曲线因此向后弯曲。


Question 6 — Human Capital (人力资本)

Define human capital and explain how it affects labor demand.

定义人力资本,并说明其如何影响劳动需求。

Training and education raise MPL; since , firms are willing to pay higher wages and hire more workers.
培训与教育提高 MPL;因 ,企业愿以更高工资雇佣更多劳动者。


Question 7 — Monopsony vs. Monopoly (买方垄断 vs. 卖方垄断)

How do monopsony in labor markets and monopoly in product markets symmetrically distort quantities and prices/wages?

劳动市场中的买方垄断与产品市场中的卖方垄断如何以对称方式扭曲数量与价格/工资?

Monopoly sets MR=MC → Q↓, P↑; monopsony sets ME=MRPL → L↓, W↓. In both cases, deadweight loss arises relative to competitive equilibrium.
垄断令 MR=MC → 产量降、价格升;买方垄断令 ME=MRPL → 雇佣量降、工资降;相对竞争均衡都产生无谓损失。


Question 8 — Role of Unions in a Monopsony (工会在买方垄断下的作用)

Why can a moderate union wage floor increase employment in a monopsonistic labor market?

为何在买方垄断的劳动市场中,适度的工会工资底线反而能提高就业?

By lowering the firm’s marginal expenditure per added worker up to the floor, the distortion of “wage rising with own hiring” is removed, expanding employment.
在底线以下,新增一人不再抬升整体工资率,边际支出下降,纠正了买方垄断的扭曲,从而扩大就业。


Question 9 — Economic Rent with Fixed Supply (固定供给与经济地租)

When the supply of a factor is perfectly inelastic (vertical), what determines its price, and what is “economic rent”?

当某要素的供给完全无弹性(垂直)时,其价格由什么决定?“经济地租”指什么?

With fixed Q, any demand shift changes only P. The gap between P and minimal required payment (often near zero for fixed land) is rent.
数量固定,需求右移只抬价不增量;价格与最低必要报酬之间的差额即地租。


Question 10 — Capital Market Analogy (资本市场类比)

State the profit-maximizing rule for capital usage and compare it to the labor hiring rule.

给出资本使用的利润最大化规则,并与劳动雇佣规则进行比较。

Both rules equate marginal benefit with marginal cost for each input. Under competition, factor prices (W, r) reflect marginal productivity, ensuring efficient allocation.
两条规则都令“边际收益 = 边际成本”。在竞争环境下,要素价格(W、r)等于边际生产力,实现资源的有效配置。